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NOTES AND COMMENTS
tiff must show circumstances pointing to both the physical and the
responsible human cause of the accident.
1 7
In the final analysis the principal case neither changes the duty of
the proprietor,18 nor does it lessen the elements to be proved by the
plaintiff1 However, the case does express a willingness on the part
of our court to allow a plaintiff to have either of these necessary ele-
ments inferred from convincing circumstancial evidence. There will
undoubtedly be many instances where a plaintiff will be unable to obtain
direct proof of either of these elements of actionable negligence. He
may then offer circumstantial evidence from which one of the elements
may be inferred. That is as far as the court has gond in this case.
The case does not, as the dissent suggests, support the proposition that
a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case merely by proving that
there was some slippery substance on the floor where she fell. Each
case must be -decided on the facts peculiar to it, and there is no question
that as past cases of this type are distinguishable on their facts, so is
the principal case distinguishable from all others.
20
DURWARD S. JONES.
Railroads-Abandonments and Partial Discontinuances of Passenger
Service-Jurisdiction-Factors in Determining
Since 1916, when railroad mileage in the United States reached its
peak,1 there has been a steady reduction of trackage and service.
2
" For an excellent distinction between circumstantial evidence and res ipsa
loquitur, see Harris v. Mangum, 183 N. C. 235, 237, 111 S. E. 177, 178 (1922)
(quoted in Howard v. Texas Co., 205 N. C. 20, 23, 169 S. E. 832, 834 (1933).
1" The proprietor is not an insurer, but owes to customers the duty to exer-
cise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and t>
give warning of unsafe conditions in so far as can be ascertained by reasonable
inspection. For a collection of cases so holding see Fanelty v. Rogers Jewelers,
Inc., 230 N. C. 694, 699, 55 S. E. 2d 493, 497 (1949).
i' See note 1 supra.
" The facts of past cases of this class did not warrant their submission to
the jury in the absence of direct evidence; with the possible exception of King
v. Thackers, Inc., 207 N. C. 869, 178 S. E. 95 (1935).
'In that year there were 435,745 miles of track in operation. See AsSOCIA-
TION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION, A STATISTICAL
REcoRD (1951). Miles of track in North Carolina reached a peak of 5,522 in
1920. See ICC, STATISTICS OF RAILROADS IN U. S. (1951).
2 Statistics on abandonments are available only from 1920, when the ICC was
given juristiction over abandonments under the Transportation Act of that year.
By 1945 there had been 33,513 abandoned miles of trackage in the United States,
613 of them being in North Carolina. See CHERINGTON, THE REGULATION OF
RAILROAD ABANDONMENT 105 (1948). There Were five additional abandonments
in North Carolina between 1945 and 1948 inclusive, cutting the railroad trackage
in the state to 4,554 miles. The figures were derived from individual abandon-
ments in REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION (1945-46, 1947-
48). No statistics are available indicating the reduction of trains nationally,
although between 1945 and 1948 inclusive, 14 daily passenger trains were dis-
continued in North Carolina.
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Among the causes of reduction in passenger service,3 and the one of
greatest present-day importance, is competition from other forms of
transportation; namely, the bus, airplane and private automobile.
4
Therefore, until the railroads can better their competitive position or
until they come merely to serve a certain limited segment of the travel-
ing public, the Interstate Commerce Commission and our state commis-
sions will be called on to continue to grant abandonments and discon-
tinuances.
Reductions in service are of two types: (1) complete abandon-
ments of certain lines or branches, and (2) partial discontinuances of
service.
The authority to abandon all or any segment of an interstate rail-
road, that is, one extending into two or more states, is within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.5 It has
power to authorize a complete abandonment of an interstate line as to
both interstate and intrastate commerce because interstate commerce
is involved. "Control is exerted over intrastate commerce only be-
cause such control is a necessary incident of freeing interstate com-
merce from the unreasonable burdens, obstruction or unjust discrimina-
tions which are found to result .... 6
Where, however, a purely intrastate railroad is involved; i. e., the
tracks of a railroad lie wholly within one state and the railroad is
being operated independently and not as a branch of any railroad en-
gaged in interstate commerce, the Interstate Commerce Commission's
authority is limited to the abandonment of the interstate business, rather
than both the interstate and intrastate business. 7 "[The railroad's]
continued operation solely in intrastate commerce cannot be of more
than local concern. Intrastate and foreign commerce will not be bur-
dened or affected by any shortage in the earnings, nor will any carrier
in such commerce have to bear or make good the shortage."8  The
' This article pertains only to reductions in passenger service. Fundamental
causes of such reductions may be divided conveniently into five categories: (1)
Competition from other forms of transportation; (2) readjustments in railroad
operating practices in a given area; (3) exhaustion or depletion of natural re-
sources, or the closing or dismantlement of non-transportation facilities; (4)
legal changes in the status of the operating railroad or of the particular segment;
and (5) miscellaneous or unknown causes. See CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra note
2, at 108.
' In North Carolina alone there are 847,331 registered motor vehicles, five
commercial airlines serving 13 cities, and 101 motor passenger carriers. See
NORTH CAROLINA ALMANAC 1951.
349 U. S. C. § 1 (18-20) (1948), Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153
(1925); Central N. E. Ry. v. B. & A. R. R., 279 U. S. 415 (1923).
' Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153, 163 (1925). This case involved
a branch line, wholly within one state, of an interstate carrier, which branch
was doing both intrastate and interstate business.
'Texas v. Eastern Texas Ry., 258 U. S. 204 (1922).
' Id. at 216. Rarely, however, will a carrier wish to, or be able to operate
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abandonment of the remaining intrastate business is within the juris-
diction of the state. In North Carolina this authority is placed in the
Utilities Commission.0 As" every projected abandonment of any part
of a railroad engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce may
conceivably involve a conflict between state and national interests;" Con-
gress provided means for cooperation between the state and the federal
government."°
Jurisdiction as to a partial discontinuance, 11 as contrasted with a
complete abandonment, is with the state; for every state has the exclu-
sive right to regulate passenger service on all railroad lines wholly
within its borders. This is true even where these lines are a part of
an interstate rail network, or where the train or trains involved run
between two or more states transporting interstate passengers.12 The
Interstate Commerce Commission has held that it has no authority to
authorize a partial discontinuance as such.'3 Therefore, until Congress
grants the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction over partial
discontinuances, the states will be free to regulate passenger service
within their boundaries even though the trains run without the state
and interstate commerce will be affected.
Most states, in regulating public utilities within their respective
borders, have given authority to a commission to see that railroads
provide reasonably adequate passenger service. 14 A few states, like
North Carolina, provide by statute what minimum service shall be
once it has been authorized to abandon its interstate business; and it may be
deprived of its property under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment if it is not then allowed to abandon its intrastate business as well. So, in
practical effect, the ICC has exclusive jurisdiction in all abandonments. See
Bullock v. Railroad Comm'n, 254 U. S. 513 (1920); Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Rail-
road Comm'n, 251 U. S. 396 (1919).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §62-96 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
1 49 U. S. C. § 13 (3) (1948). For a discussion of cooperation between fed-
eral and state regulatory bodies, see Lindahl, Cooperation Between the Inter-
state Commerce Conmission and The State Commissions in Railroad Regulation,
33 MxcH. L. REv. 338, 357 (1934). State regulatory bodies, having an intimate
knowledge of local conditions and being appreciative of local interests and needs,
may hold the original hearings pertaining to an abandonment. Recommenda-
tions as to the disposition of the cases are forwarded to the ICC. Members of
a state regulatory body might also sit with members of the ICC when an aban-
donment is under determination. Statistics indicate that these provisions are
often put into practice.
" A discontinuance of one or more, or all, of several passenger trains is a
partial discontinuance and not an abandonment.
2 Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U. S. 341 (1951);
New York Central R. R., 254 L C. C. 745, 765 (1944); Kansas City Southern
R. R., 94 I. C. C. 691 (1925).
" New York Central R. R., 254 I. C. C. 745, 765 (1944); Kansas City
Southern R. R., 94 I. C. C. 691 (1925).
"Delaware appears to be the only state without a utilities commission or its
equivalent.
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furnished, 15 but empower the commission to authorize a "railroad com-
pany to cease the operation of passenger trains as long as the con-
venience and necessity of the traveling public [do] not require such
operation."'16 While most state statutes are silent on the explicit
authority of a commission to grant discontinuances, such authority is
implicit in the agency's supervision over the service of common carriers
within the state.17 Also, it is the general rule that the commission
must hold a hearing, either upon its own motion or upon petition of
the carrier, before the carrier will be allowed to discontinue any
service.' 8
Despite the jurisdictional differences as to abandonments and partial
discontinuances, the factors in making a case for either are essentially
alike.19
"5 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 350.16 (1944) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 479.5 (1949) ; N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 62-47 (1943 Recomp. 1950) (At least one passenger train must be
ran each way daily except Sunday.)
"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 62-47 (1950). Other statutes, see note 15 supra, con-
tain similar provisions. This authorization to relax the minimum require-
ments has certain advantages. Since railroad charters or franchises are generally
governed by contract rules, and the statutory requirement would therefore become
a part of the contract, the cessation of a particular required service would other-
wise be prohibited as a breach of contract. See Field, The Withdrawal From
Service of Public Utility Companies, 35 YALE L. J. 169 (1923); and State v.
Enid, 0. & W. Ry., 103 Tex. 239, 191 S. W. 560 (1917). However, when a
railroad is authorized to abandon, it no longer continues to exercise the privi-
leges conferred by its charter. Texas R. R. Comm'n v. Eastern Texas R. R.,
264 U. S. 79 (1923). Hence, without the "relaxing" provision, railroads suf-
fering losses on operations might seek authority to abandon lines rather than
discontinue certain losing operations. Texas & N. E. R. R. v. Railroad Comm'n,
145 Tex. 541, 200 S. W. 2d 626 (1947). Some courts do not follow the "con-
tract theory," applying instead an expanded concept of due process which holds
that a carrier is deprived of property without due process of law if it is required
to furnish service on a particular line which is not required in the public interest
or which is losing money. See State of Washington v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510
(1912) ; Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 42 P. U. R. (N. S.) 417 (1950).
"7 This is attested by discontinuance hearings in states which do not mention
such authority in their statutes. E. g., Public Service Comm'n v. Capital Tran-
sit, 80 P. U. R. (N. S.) 513 (Md. 1949) ; Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 42
P. U. R. (N. S.) 417 (N. J. 1942); Union Pacific R. R., 40 P. U. R. (N. S.)
498 (Utah 1941); Colorado & Southern Ry., P. U. R. 1927E 1 (Colo.); Union
Pacific R. R., P. U. R. 1926B 541 (Neb.).
"8 ALA. CODE tit. 48 § 106 (1940); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216.62 (West 1945);
N. H. Rxv. LAws c. 289, § 26 (1942); Nay. ComP. LAWs ANN. § 504-3 (1929);
N. M. STAT. ANN. § 74-401 (1941); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 62-47 (1943 Recomp.
1950) ; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 504-3 (1946) ; S. C. CODE ANN. § 8250 (1942) ;
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 5398 (Williams 1934); Tax. STAT. ANN. § 6479 (1951);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2563 (1949); Wis. STAT. § 196-81 (1951). The require-
ment of hearing before a discontinuance may be allowed is illustrated by a recent
instance in North Carolina. The Norfolk Southern Ry. made public notice of
discontinuance and withdrew its trains without a hearing. The Utilities Com-
mission ordered a hearing before there could be discontinuance.
" However, an order authorizing a complete abandonment of a line is not
conditioned on a finding that operation will prejudice interstate commerce, or
that a railroad will be prevented from earning a fair return on its properties
as a whole, or that the entire intrastate business in a state involved will not
earn a fair return on property used therein. The sole test is whether abandon-
[Vol. 31
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Substantial losses for the particular operation are usually the mo-
tivating factor in seeking discontinuance, and there is also no doubt
that the financial ability of the carrier to continue operations has con-
stituted one of the main tests of convenience and necessity. A stronger
case is presented if the carrier is able to show that the total operating
costs exceed the total operating revenues. Although questions some-
times arise over what constitutes revenue or a proper expense,0
such controversies are greatly diminished by the Uniform System of
Accounts, prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission,2 1 along
with periodic interpretations of accounting classifications.
22
However, a mere showing of pecuniary loss from a particular opera-
tion is not of itself sufficient to justify a discontinuance. "Unlike a de-
partment store or a grocery, a railroad cannot of its own free will discon-
tinue a particular service to the public because an item of its business has
become unprofitable."' ' A failure to show that the railroad as a whole is
operating at a loss, or failing to receive a fair return on its total invest-
ment,24 will tip the scales toward a -denial of discontinuance; however, in
considering the confiscatory effect of a commission's actions, the rail-
road's income from sources other than its railroad operations should not
be taken into account. 25 " . . . even where a carrier's operations as a
whole are reasonably profitable it has been held in various cases that
it should not be required to continue the operation of passenger trains
that show such disproportionate losses as to indicate that they are not
ment is consistent with public necessity and convenience. Colorado v. United
States, 271 U. S. 153 (1926); SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CoMMIS-
SION 331 (1935).
For information on basic data to be furnished in making application to the
Interstate Commerce Commission, see ICC, IN THE MATTm OF APPLICATIONS
UNDER PARAGRAPHS (18) to (21), INcLusE, SECTION I, OF THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE ACT FOR CERTIFICATES OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY AUTHORIZING
THE ABANDONMENT OF LINES OF RAILROAD OR THE OPERATION THEREOF (July
8, 1921).
0 See Atlantic Coast Line R. R v. Public Service Comm'n, 77 F. Supp. 675
(E. D. S. C. 1948); Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. R. v. Public Service Comm'n,
221 Ind. I, 46 N. E. 2d 230 (1943) ; New York Central R. R. v. Public Utilities
Comm'n, 129 Ohio St. 381, 195 N. E. 566 (1935); Southern Ry. v. Common-
wealth, 193 Va. 291, 68 S. E. 2d 552 (1952).
1 
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTS FOR STEAM RAILROADS PRESCRIBED BY THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMiISSION IN ACCORDANCE VITH SECTION 20 PART I
OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT (1943).
"2 INTERPRETATIONS OF ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATIONS PRESCRIBED BY THE INTER-
STATE COMMERCE COMMISSION FOR STEAM RAILROADS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC-
TION 20 PART I OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT (1943). See WERMOUTH,
RAILROAD ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS (1924).
" Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern
Ry., 341 U. S. 341, 352 (1951) (concurring opinion).
See Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U. S. 341 (1951).2 2Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 77 F. Supp. 675
(E. D. S. C. 1948).
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substantially used or needed by the public." 28  The very fact that a
line of railroad does not pay the expense of running some of its trains
is cogent evidence that public convenience and necessity does not re-
quire that they be kept in operation.
2 7
Many railroads have numerous short lines which act as feeders to
main lines, and which could not be operated independently of the main
lines. While many main-line trains make substantial profits, those
profits are diluted by the losses on unprofitable branch-line operations.28
Consequently, in determining the reasonableness of any branch line
service, the relation of the branch line to the system as a whole, from
the standpoint of costs, volume of business, connections, and through
service, must be considered.
The character and population of the territory served are important
factors. 66% of North Carolina's population is rural,80 and even
though the percentage of rural population is decreasing,81 the over-all
increase in the state's population82 keeps the rural population high. Of
the remaining 34% of North Carolina's population which is in urban
areas, 8 26% is within cities of 50,000 to 100,000. Rural areas and
small urban communities tend to depend more on railroad passenger
service; nevertheless, a railroad cannot afford to suffer dispropor-
tionate losses in order to serve them.
A case for discontinuance is materially strengthened when alterna-
tive services are available, whether over the lines of the applicant car-
" Id. at 686. See also Mississippi R. R. Comm'n v. Mobile & Ohio R. R.,
244 U. S. 389 (1916); North Pacific R. R. v. Montana R. R. Comm'n, 46 F.
Supp 340 (D. Mont. 1942); Delaware, L. & W. R. R. v. Van Santwood, 216
Fed. 252 (N. D. N. Y. 1914); Blease v. Charleston & W. C. R. R., 146 S. C.
496, 144 S. E. 233 (1928); REPORT OF NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION
288 (1947-48).
Public Convenience Certificate to D. & N. M. Ry., 71 1. C. C. 795 (1922).
"The average operating ratio (operating costs divided by operating revenues,
expressed by a percentage) for passenger service on Class I railroads (those
having operating revenues over $1,000,000 annually) was 136.6 in 1949. See
AssocrATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, A REvIEw OF RAILWAY OPERATIONS IN
1950 8 (1951). It is recognized that many main-line trains, especially stream-
liners, are highly successful. The "Silver Meteor" of the Seaboard Air Line
Ry., for example, earned $2,973,930 on a gross of $5,445,699. See Profits it
Streamliners, FORTUNE May, 1950, p. 78.
"Gardner v. Commerce Comm'n, 400 IIl. 123, 79 N. E. 2d 71 (1948) ; Aban-
donment of Branch by Pere Marquette. 72 L C. C. 303 (1922) ; Abandonment of
Branch by Green Bay & W. R. R., 72 I. C. C. 647 (1922).
"BUREAU OF THE CENsuS, 1950 UNIED STATES CENSUS OF POPULATION
P-A33, 7 (1950).
"Ibid. The 1940 rural population was 73%.
"' There has been an increase from 3,571,623 in 1940 to 4,061,929 in 1950, or
13.7%.
" Under the urban definition established for use in the 1950 census, the urban
population comprises all persons living in (a) incorporated places of 2,500 or
more; (b) the densely settled urban fringe, including both incorporated and un-
incorporated areas, around cities of 50,000 or more; and (c) unincorporated
places of 2,500 inhabitants or more outside an urban fringe. There are 107
such areas in North Carolina.
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tier or some other railroad, 4 or merely by virtue of the existence of
adequate highways or bus service.8 5 Of the 34 railroads which operate
in North Carolina, only four36 provide daily passenger service. These
four railroads operate a total of 74 daily trains,3 7 but 40 of these trains
are operated on main north-south lines. There would seem to be less
likelihood that one of these main-line trains, as distinguished from a
branch-line train, would be discontinued permanently, but even if this
occurred, there would be several remaining trains. The remaining 34
trains serve communities on only ten branch lines, and while these
communities would be more adversely affected by discontinuances, al-
most all communities would be served by as frequent bus service if all
passenger trains were withdrawn.3 8  In addition to the trains are the
thousands of automobiles 9 using the 63,600 miles of roads in North
Carolina,40 and the airlines serving the major cities.
The transportation of mail is a minor factor. The postal service
is a function of the federal government, and it is the duty of the Post
Office Department to provide adequate postal service regardless of
the presence of passenger trains.4x When passenger trains are dis-
continued, highway post office service is generally provided.4 Express
service also generally presents no problem, for it can usually be given
"Mississippi R. R. Comm'n v. Mobile & Ohio R. IR, 244 U. S. 388 (1917);
Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., 162 I. C. C. 474 (1930); Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. R.,
162 I. C. C. 141 (1930); Abandonment of Line by C. R. I. P. R. R., 90 I. C. C.
645 (1924).
" Chicago, B. &. Q. R. R. v. Nebraska State Ry. Comm'n, 138 Nebr. 767,
295 N. W. 389 (1940); Abandonment by Oregon E. Ry., 145 I. C. C. 449 (1928) ;
Union Pacific R. R., 40 P. U. R. (N. S.) (1941) ; Public Service Comm'n v. Dela-
ware & Hudson R. R., 14 P. U. R. (N. S.) 326 (1935).
° Atlantic Coast Line R. R., Norfolk & Western Ry., Seaboard Air Line
R. R., and Southern Ry.
1 THE OfficIAL RAILwAY GUIDE (June, 1952). All the figures on passenger
trains in North Carolina are based on the writer's personal count of trains from
the timetables, and in no wise indicate a count from any official source. In addi-
tion to the trains given, the Clinchfield Railroad operates one train in each
direction three times a week.
8According to bus schedules, only a few stations on the Clinchfield R. R.
would be wholly without a common carrier. Actually, this is a main-line opera-
tion, but because of the shortness of the railroad and the infrequence of the
service, it was placed in this category.
"' See note 4, supra.
"o Statistics were obtained from the North Carolina Highway and Public
Works Commission. This figure does not include the Blue Ridge Parkway,
military reservation roads, or non-system roads in national parks. Of this
mileage, as of Jan. 1, 1949, 16,282 miles were hard surface, while 47,319 miles
were non hard-surface. Under the new road building program (1949-52), 12,000
additional miles are to be hard-surfaced, and 35,000 miles of other non hard-
surface roads are to be improved or all-weathered.
"Union Pacific R. R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 102 Utah 465, 132 P. 2d
128 (1942) ; Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. Illinois Central R. R., 84 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 508 (1949) ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 34 P. U. R. (N. S.) 348 (1940).
" Highway post office service is certainly a more substantial equivalent to the
railroad postal service than star routes, which was the substitution in the past.
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as prompt service by an express carrier's own trucks, regular motor
freight, passenger carriers, or by other available trains.
Important factors are the extent to which there may have been mis-
management and failure to effectuate economies in the operation of the
line.4 A commission, in its discretion, may deny the application or dis-
miss it for the time being if it thinks there has been mismanagement or
if it thinks economies may be introduced. Actually, there is much
room in the railroad industry for cutting costs. There is probably no
other industry which has been more backward in modernizing its
activities, both in operations and in administration, and despite certain
new developments, the railroads have been obstinate in adopting them.
44
Clerical costs in the industry are one-seventh of total payroll.4 72%
of operating revenues are "eaten up" by labor and material costs alone.40
Four out of five passenger cars are more than twenty years old,4 7 and
this may somewhat account for the per car average of only seventeen
passengers hauled per run in 1950.48 A criticism of the railroads would
be unduly harsh, however, without noting that "a railroad company has
but limited powers of management. It has no power to fix rates and
thus has little control over its revenue. Its control over expenses,
particularly wages, is also strictly limited-as the spiral of recent wage
increases abundantly indicates. It is restricted in its managerial func-
tions by rules arising from contracts with well-integrated and nation-
wide labor organizations. ' 49  Surely a commission will consider this
in deciding whether there might be economies.
It is said that the railroads are faced with a serious problem, for
while modernization is needed to attract more business, they do not
have the money to finance modernization, and have difficulty attracting
the capital.50 The failure to modernize is somewhat reflected in the
annual decrease of passenger business,8 1 despite the greatest peace-time
travel in history. Many, however, consider the problem of the railroad
"'Colorado & Southern Ry. Abandonment, 166 1. C. C. 470 (1930); Aban-
donment by Southern Ry., 131 1. C. C. 264 (1927); Abandonment of Line by
Southern Ry., 105 I. C. C. 228 (1928); Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines,
42 P. U. R. (N. S.) 417 (1942).
"See YOUNG, NEW RAILROADS FOR ALL (1952).
"YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 44, at 2.
"ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, A REVIEW OF RAILWAY OPERATIONS
14 (1950). Materials are fuel, power, and supplies.
"YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 44, at 2.
"Figures were obtained from ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, A RE-
VIEW OF RAILWAY OPERATIONS 14 (1950).
" Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Public Service Comm'n of S. C., 77 F. Supp.
675, 687 (E. D. S. C. 1948).
"U. S. News and World Report, Feb. 29, 1952, p. 32. Much railroad equip-
ment, however, is financed through the use of equipment trust certificates, which
find a ready market.




to be solvable and predict a good future for railroad passenger traf-
fic.
When a commission considers a case for abandonment or partial
discontinuance, it weighs all of the above factors together. In each
case the burden of proving that the proposed abandonment or discon-
tinuance will impose no serious hardship upon the public lies upon the
applicant carrier.
5 3
In the final analysis, the validity of every order of a state commis-
sion depends on a negative answer to both of these questions: (1) Does
the order constitute an undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination
against interstate commerce? 54 (2) Is the order so confiscatory as to
amount to a taking of property without due process of law, hence
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment?
An atack on an order on the theory of undue discrimination against
interstate commerce would raise the issue as to whether or not the
denial of a discontinuance might, by obliging the railroad to keep on
sustaining a loss, cause a burden to be placed on interstate commerce. 55
The usual result will be that interstate commerce will not be held bur-
dened by a continued operation, but it is conceivable that in some in-
stances an operation would unduly saddle the interstate traffic of a
carrier.
"2 See MULHFELD, THE RAILROAD PROBLEF AND ITS SOLUTION (1941) ; YOUNG,
NEW RAILROADS FOR ALL (1952) ; Profits in Streandiners, FORTUNE May, 1950,
p. 78.
" Abandonment by Hill City Ry., 150 I. C. C. 159 (1928); Pennsylvania-
Reading Seashore Lines, 42 P. U. R. (N. S.) 417 (1942).
" The Interstate Commerce Commission has the duty of determining whether
or not an order of a state commission results in discrimination. 49 U. S. C.
§ 13 (4) (Supp. 1951). There must be a hearing before that commission before
the question may be presented to the courts. Western & A. R. R. v. Georgia
Public Service Comm'n, 267 U. S. 493 (1925).
"The question of undue discrimination has heretofore been confined, with
few exceptions, to the matter of intrastate rates; and to date, the I. C. C. has
not had occasion to decide whether a denial of a partial discontinuance might,
in some instances, constitute an undue discrimination against interstate commerce.
An analogy might be drawn with the rate cases, however, to determine what
standards might be applicable. After issuance of the order, is the intrastate traf-
fic still "contributing its fair share of the revenue required to meet maintenance
and operating costs and to yield a fair return on the value of the property de-
voted to the transportation service, both interstate and intrastate." Montana
v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 778, 780 (D. Mont. 1952) (rates). The standard
for determination "in a case of this kind is not whether the intrastate traffic
is contributing its fair share of the railroad's total revenue-the question is
whether it is contributing its fair share of the revenue required to enable [the
carrier] to render adequate and efficient transportation service." Montana v. United
States, 106 F. Supp. 778, 784 (D. Mont. 1952) (rates). This determination
necessarily involves expert analysis, and unless there is a "high standard of
certainty" that the state order constitutes an undue discrimination against inter-
state commerce, it will not be overridden by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. Illinois Central R. R. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 245 U. S. 493, 510
(1917) (rates).
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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Rarely are orders pertaining to partial discontinuances attacked
on the theory of undue discrimination against interstate commerce 0
The usual theory of attack is the one presented in question (2), viz.,
whether the order amounts to a taking of property without due process
of law. The due process question normally arises from an order deny-
ing a discontinuance or abandonment. In determining whether an order
is unreasonable or arbitrary, the court must consider, in addition to
the factors already discussed, the investment in the entire system, its
earnings as a whole, what effect the losses on the trains sought to be
discontinued have on the system as a whole, with specific considera-
tion to the relative need for maintaining this train service in the terri-
tory which would be affected by the discontinuance.5" Since passen-
ger traffic as a whole is rarely profitable, it is clear, therefore, that
freight shippers must bear some of the burden of unprofitable passen-
ger service. But, if the public convenience and necessity require that
the service be continued, an order requiring continuance is within the
scope of due process."8
A review of the decisions of the North Carolina Utilities Commis-
sion indicates that it has been liberal in allowing discontinuances.
There is no doubt that it is the right of carriers to seek, and of regula-
tory agencies to permit, the elimination of those services and facilities
that are no longer needed nor used by the public to any substantial
extent. It is also manifest that carriers are justified in reducing their
expenses, where it is practicable to do so with reasonable regard to
efficiency and without impairment of their obligations. However, the
railroads have been permitted to discontinue trains to the point that
only a skeleton of passenger service remains in this state. Since so
many unprofitable trains have been taken off, the railroads should
" One reason undoubtedly is that the carrier must present this question to the
I. C. C. first, while the question of due process may be raised on an appeal from,
or on a hearing to seek an injunction against, a commission's order. See notes
54 and 55 supra.
""Mississippi R. R. Comm'n v. Mobile & Ohio R. R., 244 U. S. 388 (1917).
It is the majority view that the earnings of the entire system will be taken into
consideration in determining the effect of the losses on the trains sought to be
discontinued. Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 91 F. Supp.
980 (M. D. Ala. 1950) rev'd on other grounds 341 U. S. 341 (1951) ; Atlantic
Coast Line R. R. v. Public Service Comm'n of S. C., 77 F. Supp. 675 (E. D.
S. C. 1948). But see Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341
U. S. 341, 352 (1951) (concurring opinion) ("No showing whatever was made
that by the loss incurred in running these trains the Southern was deprived of
that protection for its investment in Alabama which alone can be made the
basis of a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.")
A state would often seem to be an economically illogical unit in determining the
effect of losses.
"' "A railway may be compelled to continue the service of a branch or part
of a line, although the operation involves a loss .... This is true even where the
system as a whole fails to earn a fair return upon the value of the property."
Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bourland, 267 U. S. 330, 332 (1925).
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now be in a better position to furnish improved service, at lower operat-
ing costs, on the remaining lines. Perhaps the railroads can make the
next step in meeting competition.59
ROGER B. HENDRIX.
Torts-Assault and Battery-Provocative Words as Defense
In a recent Louisiana case,1 plaintiff sued defendant for assault and
battery. Defendant asserted the defense of justification because of
plaintiff's use of opprobrious language directed toward him. The
court held that provocative words may be justification for an assault,
provided the person uttering the words understood or should have
understood that physical retaliation would be attempted. The words
must be "fighting" words.
2
The court based its decision, as well as previous ones to the same
effect," on a section of the Louisiana Civil Code,4 which, as interpreted
by the court prevents one who provokes the difficulty from recovering
damages for the resulting assault.5 The rule was first extended to
' Perhaps the greatest advancement that has been made in commuter and
branch-line equipment to meet the short-haul competition is the Budd RDC-1
(Rail Diesel Car). Each car is capable of carrying ninety passengers and
several cars can be coupled together to make a train. Operating costs are 550
a mile with a two-man crew and 64 a mile with a three-man crew, compared
with $1.80 a mile for a steam locomotive with two cars. The initial cost of a car
is $128,750. The price of three cars with a total seating capacity of 270 would
be $90,000 cheaper than a small diesel locomotive and three standard passenger
cars seating only 162. See Business World, Oct. 22, 1949, p. 22; Popular
Science, Dec. 1949, p. 114.
A problem which is closely related to abandonments of lines and discon-
tinuance of service is that pertaining to the abandonment of railroad stations.
See Utilities Comm'n v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 235 N. C. 273, 69 S. E. 2d
502 (1952) ; Public Service Comm'n v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 72 S. E. 2d
438 (S. C. 1952).
'Smith v. Parker, 59 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 1952).
" ...insulting or 'fighting' words . . .those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky
v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942).
"The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would be
words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. . .. Such words, as ordinary
men know are likely to cause a fight." Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire,
supra at 573 (1942).
'Oakes v. H. Weil Baking Co., 174 La. 770, 141 So. 456 (1932); Gross v.
Great A. & P. Tea Co., 25 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 1946) and cases cited therein.
ILA. STAT. ANN. § 2315 (1945) "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
5 Notes, 14 FoRD. L. REv. 95 (1945) ; 5 LA. L. REv. 617 (1944). The defense
is apparently not an extension of self-defense, but based on the theory that the
plaintiff by opprobrious language, puts himself under a legal disability to recover.
See Gross v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 25 So. 2d 837, 840 (La. App. 1945) ("The
reason is that one who uses words or actions which it may be expected will
bring about an attempt at retaliation has only himself to blame, if as a result
of the attempt at retaliation, he, himself, is injured.") . But see McCurdy v. City
Cab Co., 32 So. 2d 720, 723 (La. App. 1947) ; Ponthieu v. Coco, 18 So. 2d 351,
355 (La. App. 1944). In these cases the court referred to the plaintiffs as the
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